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Abstract
In terms of cartel regulation, Korea has a “presumption of agreement” provision that does
not exist in the United States or in the European Union (EU).
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA).

This provision is Article 19(5) of the

This provision was created for the convenience of

enforcement because firms made cartel agreements by more sophisticated methods as the cartel
regulation became more intense.

Accordingly, in the continental law of Korea the approach of the

courts in relation to cartel regulation is somewhat different to the United States.

However, in terms of a

standard for deciding specifically what to regulate as a cartel and what to permit, Korea, the United
States, and the EU use generally similar standards.

Prohibiting tacit agreements as cartels but not

regulating conscious parallelism is common to these countries.
In relation to the effect of the presumption, the issue is whether to understand the
presumption in Article 19(5) of the MRFTA as a civil procedure law presumption or as an “administrative
law presumption”.
methods.

In terms of methods of applying the provisions, these can broadly be divided into two

First, there is the stance of the Korean Supreme Court, which interprets Article 19(5) faithfully

to its wording, the cases hold that if one only proves the two facts of “outward conformity of conduct”
and “competition-restrictiveness”, then the firm provisionally “shall be presumed to have committed an
unfair collaborative act.” Recently, however, many cases have emerged in which the presumption was
rebutted.

Second, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (FTC), even if it proves the “outward conformity

of conduct” and “competition-restrictiveness,” does not regulate the “agreement” directly as an undue
collaborative act by presumption, but it investigates deeply into the facts of an agreement to engage in
collaborative acts or circumstantial facts so as to factually presume that the outward conformity of
conduct was a collaborative act due to an agreement.
In fact, the result is that the presumption provision Article 19(5) of the MRFTA is enforced,
differing from a civil procedure law presumption.

As a result, cases follow the process of overturning

the presumption again after first allowing the presumption of agreement due to Article 19(5) of the
MRFTA.

However in reality they regulate the cartels focusing on the same basis as the United States

and the EU.

The ultimate difference is that in the case of Korea, the burden of proof is on the firm to

prove that there was no agreement.

But, as stated above, it is ultimately desirable to amend or delete

Article 19(5) of the MRFTA due to the problems of the imbalance in the burden of proof.
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I. Introduction
In terms of cartel regulation, Korea has a “presumption of agreement” provision that does
not exist in the United States or in the European Union (EU)1.
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA).

This provision is Article 19(5) of the

This provision was created for the convenience of

enforcement because firms made cartel agreements by more sophisticated methods as the cartel regulation
became more intense.

Further, this also reflects the government’s firm intention to solve the chronic

problem in Korean markets of cartels being formed in various industries due to the small scale of those
markets.

Accordingly, in the continental law of Korea the approach of the courts in relation to cartel

regulation is somewhat different to the United States.

However, in terms of a standard for deciding

specifically what to regulate as a cartel and what to permit, Korea, the United States, and the EU use
generally similar standards.

Prohibiting tacit agreements as cartels but not regulating conscious

parallelism is common to these countries.

Article 19(5) states:

Where two or more enterprisers are committing any acts listed in the subparagraphs of
paragraph (1) that practically restrict competition in a particular business area, they shall be
presumed to have committed an unfair collaborative act despite the absence of an express
agreement to engage in such an act.

It is possible to broadly categorize the problems raised in relation to the presumption in this
provision into those regarding the conditions triggering the presumption and those regarding the effect of
the presumption.

In relation to the conditions triggering the presumption, in order to trigger the

presumption of an agreement between firms, opinions are divided as to whether it is enough to only prove
the “matching outward appearance” and “competitive-restrictiveness” of the conduct, or whether it is also
necessary that there be circumstantial facts (additional factors) to trigger the presumption of an agreement
between the firms.

Further, regarding the “competition-restrictiveness” element that needs to be proved

in order to presume the existence of an agreement, there is a case which held that this meant
“competition- restrictiveness” in that state prior to the presumption of agreement.

That is, one opinion is

that one must judge whether or not there is “competition restrictiveness” by hypothesizing a situation
where there is no agreement between firms.
1

Another opinion is that this means “competition-

EU Treaty Article 81
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those
which:
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restrictiveness” in the case where the conduct has been carried out under agreement or tacit understanding.
In relation to the effect of the presumption, the issue is whether to understand the presumption in Article
19(5) of the MRFTA as a civil procedure law presumption or as an “administrative law presumption”.
In terms of methods of applying the provisions, these can broadly be divided into two methods.

First, there is the stance of the Korean Supreme Court, which is to interpret “presumption”
as a legislative presumption. This does not require an additional circumstantial factor apart from “outward
conformity of conduct” and “competition-restrictiveness”, but the presumption can be rebutted by proof
that the “outward conformity” was not due to an agreement.

Second, there is the EU stance, which provides for a special presumption under
administrative law.

This is interpreted as a “triggering requirement” or “commencing conditions”

(Auffangtatbestand, Aufgreiftatbestände), where the competition authorities prove that there was an
agreement and the burden of proof shifts to the defendant firm.

II. Background to Adoption of 19(5) of MRFTA
1. State of cartels in Korean market
Korea’s industrial structure was formed into an oligopoly system in the major heavy
industries in the process of promoting rapid economic development.
was easy to form cartels as the firms required only very little outlay.

Under this industrial structure it
This is thought to be the reason for

the emergence of cartels in industries such as oil refining, petrochemicals, paper manufacturing, cement
and steel. For instance there are only two coffee manufacturing companies in Korea – Dong Suh Foods
Co. Ltd. and Nestle Korea Ltd.

In terms of indexes showing the extent of market monopolization and oligopolization, one
can cite the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and CR2 (concentration ratio for two firms).

KFTC

requested the Korea Development Institute (KDI) to investigate Korea’s HHI and CR. KDI found that
Korea’s HHI and CR were much higher than in the US and Japan, showing that the extent of
monopolization and oligopolization in Korea is very serious (Heo, 2004,539).

Turning to the industries where cartels arose, of the industries needing sanctions for
cartelization, the field which most frequently had cartels arise was the manufacturing industry (42%).
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Recently, cartels in the service field, such as education, real estate etc. have been forming, increasing
dramatically post-1997.

2. Empirical Evidence of damage from cartels
KFTC discovered a price cartel between three school uniform businesses and gave
corrective orders regarding these in May 2001, calculating the cost saving to consumers (damage to
consumers) to be approximately 60 billion Won annually.

As a result of market research carried out

after the corrective measures in relation to the school uniforms cartel, it became apparent that
blouses/blazers dropped 30 thousand Won and shirts 10 thousand Won in price. This was calculated
considering the trade volume of school uniforms was 1.5 million.

As a result of the KFTC uncovering a

tendering cartel between construction companies that participated in public construction works and giving
correcting orders, the successful bid rate for public works fell from 87% in 1997 to 75% in 2000,
considering the scale of public construction works in Korea it can be presumed that this had the effect of
saving the national budget (damage from cartels) 4 trillion Won annually.

In the case of the lead

electrode international cartel, for the five year period of the cartel, this brought about an approximate 50%
price increase in the Korean market, including electric oven businesses, and it was calculated that
domestic businesses suffered damage of approximately $139 million (183 trillion Won).

3. Origins of Undue Collaborative Act Provisions
(1) Cartel regulation at the time of introduction of MRFTA
The direct cause for the commencing of efforts to regulate cartels in Korea in 1963 was the
so-called “three powder profiteering incident” which occurred in that year.

This incident saw

manufacturers of the so-called “three powders” ie., cement, wheat flour and sugar, take monopoly profits
by raising greatly their prices through cartels. Sparked by this incident, the monopolists’ unfair conduct
gave rise to major public criticism politically and socially, so a public debate started regarding the
enactment of a fair trade law to prevent monopolization.

(2) Amendment of 31 December 1986 – Introduction of
presumption article
Since proving the existence of cartels is difficult, even though we have seen above that their
ill-effects are large, the 1986 amendment introduced the system of presuming undue collaborative acts,
which is understood to be a characteristic of Korea’s MRFTA regulations, to solve this problem.
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(3) Amendment of 5 February 1999
The competition-restrictiveness of cartels, since they are generally a “ceasefire agreement”
between enterprises to stop competition itself, is much more direct than mergers.

In contrast, in the case

of mergers, there are pro-competitive points such as economies of scale and efficiencies in enterprise
management and it is difficult to find the competition restrictiveness in mergers themselves.
Accordingly, in the case of merger regulations, in order to regulate only competition-restrictive mergers
by examining whether there is competition-restrictiveness after defining the relevant market, Article 7(1)
provides that “no one shall practically suppress competition in a particular business area.”

In the case of

cartels, however, based on a judgment that there is no need to go strictly through this process, the 5
February 1999 amendment changed the MRFTA Article 19(1) from indicating “that practically restrict
competition in a particular business area” to “that unfairly restricts competition.”

III. Presumption of Agreements and the standard for rebuttal
Naturally, the issue is what sort of conduct to regulate as a cartel and what limits should be
in place.

As we shall see below, this can be examined by comparing past KFTC decisions and the

United States and EU cases where an additional circumstantial factor was demanded, with factors that the
Korean Supreme Court has considered when overcoming the presumption of agreement.

1. Distinction
parallelism

between

tacit

agreement

and

conscious

While it is possible to explicitly agree to an undue collaborative act, these have almost
ceased to exist since competition authority regulation tightened, and the major part of these agreements
are now conducted tacitly.

Tacit agreements and conscious parallelism are similar in the points that both

types of conduct have a conformity of outward appearance, while it is hard to find direct evidence of an
agreement.

In the case of tacit agreement, however, regarding the point that there must at least have

been a “meeting of minds”.

It is different from “conscious parallelism” which exhibits conformity of

conduct as a result of interdependence without any communication of intention.

Conscious parallelism may frequently occur in oligopolistic markets where only a few
firms exist.

This is because, in oligopolistic markets, the pattern of the firms’ conduct is interdependent

(Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2003, 1429a).

Each firm competing in the oligopolistic market, by merely
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observing the conduct of other firms and then based on its own prediction and simply adjusting prices or
setting production levels, may produce economic effects the same or similar to cartels (Areeda &
Hovenkamp, 2003, 1429b). That is, in the case of conscious parallelism, even if there is no agreement
between the firms, they may try to fix prices at a level higher than the competitive price and set
production levels at a level lower than production levels in competitive markets through a process of
rational decision-making.

Should merely conscious parallelism be viewed as illegal, then where there is
interdependency in oligopolistic markets, one may not expect legal conduct by firms which would force
firms to make irrational decisions. Accordingly illegality merely due to conscious parallelism is not
accepted (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2003, 1432d3).

2. Korean Cases relating to the interpretation of the
presumption article
In order for there to be a presumption of “agreement between firms” based on Art 19(5) of
the MRFTA, recent Korean Supreme Court decisions have consistently held that it is sufficient merely to
prove “conformity of outward conduct” and “competition-restrictiveness” and that there is no need in
addition to this to prove circumstantial facts so as to presume the firms’ agreement or tacit understanding.
(Supreme Court decision of 3.15.2002; Supreme Court decision of 5.27.2003) This view states that the
circumstantial facts for presuming an agreement or tacit understanding are rather circumstantial evidence
to presume in fact an “agreement” of Article 19(1).

Meanwhile, the Korean Supreme Court held that one may rebut the presumption of
agreement in the following sorts of cases:

First, the presumption of agreement to engage in collaborative acts under Article 19(1) can
be rebutted by proving that there was no agreement to engage in undue collaborative acts and that the
conformity of conduct was ultimately coincidental and arrived at independently according to the
managerial judgments of each firm without any agreement, even though the same or similar conduct
appeared externally. (Supreme Court decision of 12.12.2003; Supreme Court decision of 2.28.2003)

Second, one can rebut the presumption by proving circumstances that lead one to accept
that the same or similar conduct appearing externally was not a collaborative act by any cartel agreement
but for some other reasons. (Supreme Court decision of 12.12.2003; Supreme Court decision of
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2.28.2003; Supreme Court decision of 1.28.2005)

Third, under oligopolistic market structures, the market leader with a high market share sets
the price by its independent decision while weaker firms set their price imitating this unilaterally.

In

such a case, if the market leader sets the price in light of the circumstances of the market such as the
hitherto customs, as long as there are no special circumstances where it can be predicted that the follower
firms set their prices in alignment with this, the presumption of agreement to engage in undue
collaborative acts under Article 19(5) is rebutted. (Supreme Court decision of 5.28.2002)

These standards, as we shall see below, are similar in content to the additional
circumstantial evidence required for regulating conscious parallelism as a form of cartel in the USA and
the EU cases.

3. USA and the EU Cases
In the United States, in order for conscious parallelism to be prohibited as a cartel one must
provide circumstantial evidence of various sorts to make the presumption of agreement possible.

The

“outwards conformity of conduct” amounts to only a single factor in detecting and commencing
investigations into the cartel.

According to “Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors” of the United
States and “Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation
Agreements” of the EU, where an agreement has been found, first it is classified as either a “hard-core
cartel” or “soft-core cartel” and they are regulated based on judging hard-core cartels as per se illegal
without examining the competition-restrictiveness additionally and judging the competitionrestrictiveness of soft-core cartels according to a rule of reason at the next stage.
In the United States Petroleum Products Antitrust Case (906 F. 2d 432, the 9th Cir. 1990),
price cartels were the issue.

Accordingly, it was a case where it would be held to be per se illegal so

long as an agreement was proven.

Yet in this case the agreement was not recognized directly as parallel

price-fixing, i.e. conscious parallelism was found, and the United States 9th Circuit Court of Appeal did
not recognize the cartel as there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to presume an agreement.

In

this case much importance was placed on the proof of contact between enterprisers, especially internal
documents regarding meetings between staffs of the petroleum companies and the testimony of the staff
who had attended the meetings.

In particular, the detailed explanation regarding the credibility of the
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testimony of relevant staff, and how this was evaluated in relation to the presumption of collusion, was
very prominent.

It is also true in Korean cases that evidence relating to contacts between companies’ staff is
the most important material in the contest of presumption of cartel agreements.

In the majority of KFTC

decisions and Korean Supreme Court judgments, however, there is not a very deep analysis regarding the
internal positions of the staff who participated in the meetings, especially in the aspects of how much
influence they have in price determination, and how to judge their hearsay evidence.

The KFTC, in the case concerning a price cartel between Dong Suh Foods and Nestle
Korea in Korea’s coffee market which is a perfect oligopolistic market, provided only its consideration
for conclusions that the exchange of information was between the sales staff of branch offices, not the
responsible staff at the head offices and that the meeting time coincided with the price rising time.

But

there is no explanation regarding the contents of the specific testimony of the relevant witnesses.

In this case the Korean Supreme Court held that “Where two firms which shared the
domestic coffee market raised the price of the coffee products competitively in order to expand their
market shares, considering the peculiar circumstances of the domestic coffee market at that time when if
your product was cheaper than that of the competitor it did not sell well, the competition-restrictiveness
was lacking.” (Supreme Court decision of 3.15.2002) Thus, the Court did not allow the presumption of
agreement in Article 19(5) of the MRFTA. The expression used was “competition-restrictiveness”, but the
contents were the same as the circumstantial evidence for the presuming the agreement.

In the Reserve Supply Corporation v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation case (971
F.2d 37, the 7th Cir. 1992), the United States 7th Circuit Court of Appeals did not find an agreement
regardomg the conformity of price i.e. conscious parallelism.

Similarly, the Korean Supreme Court

overturned the presumption of agreement in the Four Tissue Paper Manufacturers price leadership case
(Supreme Court decision of 5.28.2002). The two cases have four things in common with each other.

First, the standard prices were uniform in the relevant market, but actual supply price was
discounted according to the individual pricing negotiation with distributors, so agreement could not be
presumed from the uniformity of standard prices.
materials were identical or similar.
distributors.

Second, products were highly standardized and raw

Third, the fact of the price increases had already been notified to

Fourth, in oligopoly markets the phenomenon of price leadership exists between

competitors.

9

But the Korean case examined whether an agreement should be presumed or not depending
mainly on price leadership.

However, the US case provided specific criteria to determine whether

parallel conduct was due to price leadership or conspiracy.

In judging this, the US court engaged in

detailed analysis of relevant market structure and distribution customs.

In particular, that decision held

that it was important to show whether the profit that the firms gained in the relevant market was supracompetitive profit due to the existence of a cartel or normal profit.

The Woodpulp Ahlstrom and Others v. Commission case in the EU (89, 104, 114, 116-17,
125-129/85[1993] E.C.R. 1-1307) is similar to the Three Paper manufacturers demurrer case in Korea
(KFTC 1996.10.15, Decision No. 96-19) in the following points.

First, the demander of the product was

in a superior position to the supplier and prices were set uniformly according to the requirements of the
demander.

Second, there was almost no difference in raw material price as the product was of the same

grade and there was no difference in quality.

Third, price discrimination between firms was not

permitted, as the number of the demanders was limited.

In the Korean case the KFTC presumed the existence of an agreement, based on
correspondence between the firms, even though the product, newsprint, had similar causes for the price
increase, such as the same grade, quality and price of raw materials. Furthermore the purchasers,
newspaper firms, were not necessarily in superior positions compared to the suppliers, paper
manufacturers.

By adopting the principle of requiring proof of additional factors in the Woodpulp case, the
European Court of Justice imposed a very strict burden of proof on the plaintiffs.
provide conclusive, clear and consistent proof.

The plaintiff had to

Parallel conduct would not be sufficient proof of a cartel.

If this standard had applied in the KFTC, the plaintiff in the above decision, it could not have provided
sufficient proof because the parallel price increases could not necessarily be explained solely by a prior
agreement in view of the newsprint product and its market characteristics.

4. Legal Presumption and Factual Presumption in civil
procedure law
A “presumption” is generally the conclusions drawn about one fact from another fact. There
are “factual presumptions” and “legal presumptions”.
“Factual presumptions” refer to presumptions carried out in the application of rules of
experience, which related to conclusion of a primary fact from one or several indirect facts based on rules

10

of experience in a specific case (Ho, 2004, 429).
“Legal presumptions” refer to presumptions which have become legal provision, which
reflect rules of experience in legislation. There are cases where a certain fact is presumed and others
where a certain right is presumed by a legal provision (Ho, 2004, 448).

In the case where legal facts are presumed, the party may directly prove the conditional fact
(B) provided that it bears the burden of proving according to general evidentiary principles.
alternatively prove facts basic to a presumption (A), which are easier to prove.

Or it may

In cases where there is

proof of facts basic to a presumption (A) since the conditional fact (B) is then presumed, the effect is the
same as the case where the presumed fact is proved directly.

Legal presumption provisions have the

effect of easing the burden of proof in the sense that they permit the choice or alteration of the matters to
be proved.

Parties trying to avoid the application of a presumption provision when disputing a legal
presumption may either contest the facts basic to the presumption (A) or dispute the conditional fact (B),
which has been presumed, in an effort to remove the effect of the presumption.

First, in the case where

one contests the facts basic to the presumption (A) it is sufficient to disturb the facts basic to the
presumption through counterevidence.

In contrast, in the case where the facts basic to the presumption

(A) are proven, this is different from a factual presumption because it is not merely an issue of the judge’s
deliberation in the sense of the scope of their free deliberation, so the presumption must be rebutted with
strong counterevidence.

The cases also, in the case of a legal presumption of fact, state that the party

asserting the contrary fact bears the burden of proof.

In this sense, once can say that the burden of proof

has been shifted (Song, 2004, 636-637).

5. Examination
In the United States and EU there is no presumption provision in the legislation allowing
presumption of an agreement so that only a factual presumption through proving circumstantial facts
exists, and that competition-restrictiveness is not a matter which is required to be proven for the factual
presumption and must always be proved separately by the competition authorities.
significant procedural difference from the Korean cases.

This reveals a

However, in terms of a delimitation line for

recognizing agreements in specific cases to regulate cartels, Korea draws a similar boundary line to the
EU.

In the result, the difference is in the issue of allocating the burden of proof.

11

The Korean

Supreme Court, after presuming an agreement provisionally bound by Article 19(5), may overturn the
presumption where it is inappropriate in specific cases.
subject to the presumption, bear the burden of proof.

But the firms who deny the fact, which are

In contrast, in the United States and EU cases the

burden of proof of additional circumstantial evidence remains with the competition authorities.

While

the Korean Supreme Court, in consideration of this irrationality, views the “presumption” in Article 19(5)
of the MRFTA as a legislative presumption, by applying loosely the extent of proof needed for
overcoming the legislative presumption, comparatively easily allow the rebuttal of the presumption.
However, this has resulted in the legal principle of the presumption being applied inconsistently.

Accordingly, the KFTC, which regulates collaborative acts or the plaintiff seeking
compensatory damages for violation of MRFTA, is exempted from the responsibility to prove the
existence of the agreement, while the firms, in order to overcome the presumption, must prove the fact
that their conduct’s conformity was not based on an agreement but was the result of the individual firm’s
independent managerial decision.

However, since there is no direct proof that can show the non-

existence of an agreement, there is no choice but to disprove this by indirect evidence.

Yet this is much

more difficult than proving the existence of an agreement, and in some cases this may be practically
impossible to prove.

A firm, in order to overcome the presumption, can only prove the non-existence of indirect
certain facts supplied by the KFTC, particularly that there was no restriction on competition, or provide
other circumstantial existence to prove the non-existence of an agreement.
was no restriction on competition, is not a simple factual matter.

However proving that there

Therefore where the KFTC has

adduced that there is competition-restrictiveness and presumed the agreement, even if the firm makes a
different assertion, it is not easy to succeed in disproving this as it is a value judgement regarding
“competition-restrictiveness.”

When proving the non-existence of an agreement the circumstantial facts

must show that there was no agreement.

Yet in the process of proving this assertion, ultimately the legal

presumption and factual presumption overlap in that the judgment process is the same as the presumption
of agreement in fact by circumstantial facts (Lee, 2002, 78).

This stance ossifies the free economic activity of firms which may be called a “cartel” so
that in terms of interpretation an administrative presumption approach is appropriate, or in terms of
legislative reform, the deletion of Article 19(5) of the MRFTA is desirable.
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IV. Interpretation of “Presumption”
1. Legal Presumption approach – stance of the Korean
Supreme Court
The cases view the “presumption” in Article 19(5) of the MRFTA, interpreting it faithfully
to its wording, as a civil law legal presumption in the nature of a presumption of a fact. Article 19(5) of
the MRFTA is viewed as a legal presumption of a fact because literally it is a presumption carried out by
applying a legal provision in a regulation directly and it is a provision that presumes a certain fact (B)
where there is a certain factual premise (A).

Accordingly, parties that have to rebut a legal presumption

must perfectly prove the truth of opposing facts which are sufficient to overturn the facts presumed.

It is

not sufficient that the court has some doubt about the existence of the presumed facts (Yun, 2002, 236)
If the party cannot rebut with certainty the fact presumed at law, then it suffers the
disadvantage of the burden of proof.

The cases may presume in fact through the proof of circumstantial facts an agreement or
tacit understanding under Article 19(1) of the MRFTA, but the presumption of agreement under Article
19(5) makes it clear that this is a legal presumption (Supreme Court decision of 3.15.2002, 99du6514,
6521).

2. Administrative Law Presumption Theory
This opinion takes the view that the MFRTA presumption is a unique administrative law
presumption that is different from a civil procedure law presumption.

The KFTC must commence

specific procedures where its conditions are satisfied, and these may be called “triggering requirements”
or “commencing conditions” (Auffangtatbestand, Aufgreiftatbestände).

However, one must make sure

that this does not displace the principle of the power of the KFTC to conduct investigations under Article
49 of the MRFTA.

Accordingly, this presumption has no direct relationship with the evidential burden

or formal burden of proof, it only relates to a substantial burden of proof.

That is, where the conditions

of the presumption are satisfied, it is not the fact that the burden of proof shifts and the party has to
provide counterevidence in order to rebut the presumption, rather that the KFTC still bears the duty to
investigate comprehensively the existence of an agreement.

Despite the KFTC carrying out its duty

faithfully where there still remains some uncertainty, the enterpriser who wishes to rebut the presumption
at that point for the first time comes to bear the burden of proof (Kwon, 2002, 277).
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Article 81 of the EC Treaty provides:

The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the common market.

In practice, in Europe “concerted practices” are triggering requirements under Article 81 of
the EC Treaty, and are used as means for detecting cartels (Änderung des GWB (1973), BT-Drucks. 7/765,
S. 10).

The problem arises regarding the extent to which the KFTC must engage in investigative
activities to carry out its duties faithfully.

In cases where it cannot be said that the KFTC did not carry

out its duties faithfully, one can point out that the legal ramifications of this are not clear.

According to

the administrative law presumption theory, if the KFTC does not carry out faithfully its investigatory
activities for distinguishing whether or not there has been an agreement, then it cannot apply the
presumption provision.

3.

Problems with the theory in the Cases of Korean Supreme

Court
In the Korean Supreme Court cases, that the “presumption” in Article 19(5) of the MRFTA
is viewed as a civil procedure law presumption so that it is easy to admit collaborative acts and then the
process of rebutting this is repeated results from a misunderstanding in the communication between the
government authorities that drafted the MRFTA and the courts.
many cases in which the KFTC drafts this.

In the case of the MRFTA, there are

Accordingly, the stance of the KFTC is the most consistent

with the legislative purpose of the drafting of the MRFTA. The KFTC in the past has taken the stance of
additionally requiring proof of circumstantial facts even when the elements of “outward conformity of
conduct” and “competition-restrictiveness” under the Article 19(5) are proven.

In Article 19(5) the expression “that practically restrict competition in a particular business
area” also appears to have the purpose of reasonably restricting the scope of the Article by considering
additional circumstantial facts, and not just prohibiting unconditionally as undue collaborative acts the
conformity of conduct in relation to price, trading conditions and delivery.
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In the MRFTA, inasmuch as it is a law that regulates the economic life of the citizenry,
legal certainty is very important, so the courts cannot accept the unfiltered stance of the KFTC and must
consider the legal certainty of a law from the perspective of the citizenry.

The Korean Supreme Court,

based on this ideal, interprets this Article from the perspective of the whole legal order.

By classifying this provision mechanically, however, the stance of the cases is an overly
artificial interpretation, which states that where the two conditions of “competition-restrictiveness” and
“outward uniformity of conduct” are satisfied the agreement is legally presumed as a matter of course.
Competition-restrictiveness is an issue of value judgment and not a factual one so viewing this as a fact
required to be proven separately is overly formalistic.

When one follows this sort of mechanical

interpretation, the agreement is presumed only as a direct result of having proved the two elements of
“competition-restrictiveness” and “outward conformity of conduct.”

Accordingly, before proving

competition-restrictiveness, it is still the stage prior to the agreement being presumed.

Hence the cases

contain the extreme formalism of having to assume that there is no agreement when judging the
competition-restrictiveness.

For example, in the case of a price cartel or a market division cartel, the parties usually
have agreed not to compete on price or to divide the market, and since this sort of agreement itself is a
“ceasefire agreement” to cease competition one can admit its competition-restrictiveness.

In the case of

price cartels, however, as we shall see below, simply because price have risen uniformly, leaving aside
any agreement, it is difficult to see this as competition-restrictive.

Even in market division cartels, cases

where markets become divided coincidentally or of their own accord absent any agreement, it is hard to
admit the competition-restrictiveness.

Exceptionally, in the case of trading condition cartels, if trading

conditions become uniform this may promote price competition, so there is a need to reexamine
competition-restrictiveness.
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Let’s assume the perfect competition market where the goods traded are identical. In this
market, in the case of a rise in the price of raw materials, the supply curve shifts from S1 to S2, and
corresponding to this the market price rises from P1 to P2 and the quantity supplied shrinks from Q1 to
Q2

P

D

S2
S1

P2
P1

D

Q
Q2

Q1

That is to say, even in the case of perfect competition, there can be any number of cases that
could occur in which price rises at the same level and production volumes shrink.

The same

phenomenon may occur even in the case of an oligopolstic market operating competitively.

Accordingly, in an oligopolistic market, the fact that the prices rise uniformly and
production volumes fall may be the result of competition or the result of an agreement.

It is irrational to

presume directly the existence of an agreement merely because price rises and supply volume shrinkages
appeared uniform outwardly.

Viewed this way, in an oligopolistic market, the fact that prices rise at the

same level is a necessary condition to show substantive competition-restrictiveness, but it is not a
sufficient condition.

South Korea’s “Guidelines for Collaborative Acts” were established in May 2002 with
reference to “Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors” of the United States and the
EU’s “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation
Agreements” and altered to suit Korea’s circumstances.

Under the Korean regulatory framework, at the

stage of examining the illegality of cartels, one must first classify it as either a hard-core cartel or softcore cartel.

Hard-core cartels such as price-fixing cartels are judged per se illegal without examining the
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competition-restrictiveness separately.

Soft-core cartels are judged in terms of their competitive-

restrictiveness by applying the rule of reason.

That is, hard-core cartels are found illegal directly once

an agreement is proved, while soft-core cartels are illegal provided that competition-restrictiveness is
proved together with an agreement.

Yet the Korean Supreme Court cases do not distinguish between hard-core and soft-core
cartels, holding that an agreement may be presumed where one can prove “outward conformity of
conduct” and “competition-restrictiveness”.

Accordingly, the words “committing any acts listed in the subparagraphs of paragraph (1)
that practically restrict competition in a particular business area” in Article 19(5) of the MRFTA should
not be interpreted mechanically so as to judge separately “competition-restrictiveness” and “outward
conformity of conduct”, but so as to mean that it will regulate the outward conformity of conduct, i.e.
conscious parallelism as undue collaborative acts in a way that is restricted appropriately.

4. Norms of the Administrative Law Presumption Theory
The fact that the legislators used the term “presumption” in the MRFTA Article 19(5), in
contrast to the term “deem”, was so that it would be able to be comparatively easy to rebut.

The same

term “presumption” is used in Article 19(5), however, because as the regulation of undue collaborative
acts tightened the firms did not hold meetings or draw up agreements naively like in the old days, but
engaged in collaborative acts secretly by increasingly sophisticated methods, so one see that it was
legislation with the object of lessening the difficulties of proof.

One can express cartel regulation as an

eternal race between competition authorities and firms. The special character of cartels makes 100% proof
nearly impossible.

In such a case, if the KFTC proves circumstantial evidence to about 80%, the

legislative purpose was to allow regulation by presuming the undue collaborative act.

Accordingly, where conditions of MRFTA Article 19(1) are fulfilled, the agreement is not
directly presumed, and the KFTC initiates regulatory procedures.

In the case where parts of the case

remain unclear despite the KFTC carrying out its duties faithfully, it is appropriate that the existence of an
agreement be presumed and the firm from that point for the first time bears the burden of proving the nonexistence of the agreement.
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V. Legislative Reform
In the case of conscious parallelism, this is not regulated directly as a cartel; rather as an
additional factor that triggers the presumption of agreement is the legal enforcement trend in each country.
With reference to this, it is desirable that Korea also should not presume an agreement and regulate it as
an undue collaborative act, merely because it is provided that 2 or more firms engaged in conduct listed in
Article 19(1) of the MRFTA.

Rather it is desirable that this Article be amended in the direction of

presuming the existence of an agreement only in the cases where the court comprehensively considers
matters such as the relevant market structure and performance, barriers to entry, and market power of
firms, and when there is no alternative explanation other than that this is the result of an undue
collaborative act (Kwon, 2002, 279).
It would be induced to a factual presumption to prove the existence of an agreement based
on rules of experience.

Accordingly, it is appropriate that the proof of this additional factor be left to a

factual presumption proving an “agreement” in Article 19(1) of the MRFTA, and that Article 19(5) be
deleted.

VI. Conclusion
In interpreting Article 19(5) faithfully to its wording, the cases hold that if one only proves
the two facts of “outward conformity of conduct” and “competition-restrictiveness” that the firm
provisionally “shall be presumed to have committed an unfair collaborative act.”

Recently, however,

many cases have emerged in which the presumption was rebutted, in the cases when proving the fact that
there was no agreement regarding an undue collaborative act, when proving circumstances in which one
can accept that outwardly same or similar conduct there was not a collaborative act due to an agreement,
or when in an oligopoly a market leader with a high market share set a price based on its independent
judgment which was subsequently imitated by following firms unilaterally.

Since the conditions of the

presumption of agreement in terms of the interpretation of Article 5(5) of the MRFTA were loosened, the
courts have found the appropriate outcome by limiting appropriately the presumption of agreement in
specific cases.

Also, the KFTC, even if it proves the “outward conformity of conduct” and

“competition-restrictiveness,” does not regulate the “agreement” directly as an undue collaborative act by
presumption, but it investigates deeply into the facts of an agreement to engage in collaborative acts or
circumstantial facts so as to factually presume that the outward conformity of conduct was a collaborative
act due to an agreement.

In fact, the result is that the presumption provision Article 19(5) of the MRFTA

is enforced, as it is in the United States and the EU, differing from a civil procedure law presumption.
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As a result, cases follow the process of overturning the presumption again after first allowing the
presumption of agreement due to Article 19(5) of the MRFTA.

However in reality they regulate the

cartels focusing on the same basis as the United States and the EU.

The ultimate difference is that in the

case of Korea, the burden of proof is on the firm to prove that there was no agreement.

However, as

stated above, it is ultimately desirable to amend or delete Article 19(5) of the MRFTA due to the problems
of the imbalance in the burden of proof.
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